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THE SYSTEMIC RISK OF PRIVATE FUNDS
AFTER THE DODD-FRANK ACT
Wulf A. Kaal*
ABSTRACT
The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) was created under
the Dodd-Frank Act with the primary mandate of guarding against systemic risk and correcting perceived regulatory weaknesses that may have
contributed to the financial crisis of 2008-2009. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) collects data pertaining to private fund advisers
in order to facilitate FSOC’s assessment of non-bank financial institutions’
potential systemic risks. Evidence that the SEC’s data collection encounters accuracy and consistency problems might hamper FSOC’s ability
to evaluate the systemic risk of private fund advisers. The author shows
that while the SEC’s data plays a crucial role in all stages of FSOC’s systemic risk assessment of private fund advisers, FSOC relies most heavily on
some of the most problematic disclosure items collected by the SEC.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The possible systemic risk posed by the private fund industry has been
the subject of a long policy debate. Prior to the financial crisis of
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Robert N. Farris provided outstanding research assistance. He is grateful for research
assistance from research librarians Valerie Aggerbeck and Robert N. Farris.
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2008–2009, the demise of large private funds1 seemed to highlight the potential systemic risk posed by the private fund industry.2 The private fund
industry’s retailization3 and increasing private fund adviser fraud4 further
1. Prominent examples include: Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998,
see Philippe Jorion, Risk Management Lessons from Long-Term Capital Management, 6 EUR.
FIN. MGMT. 277 (2000) (drawing risk management lessons from LTCM); Paul N. Roth &
Brian H. Fortune, Hedge Fund Regulation in the Aftermath of Long-Term Capital Management, in HEDGE FUNDS: LAW AND REGULATION 83 (Iain Cullen & Helen Parry eds., 2001)
(describing the industry response to LTCM’s collapse); Amaranth in 2006, see René M. Stulz,
Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 175, 188 (2007) (“[T]he Amaranth losses led to calls for regulation of hedge funds.”); Ludwig B. Chincarini, The Amaranth Debacle: A Failure of Risk Measures or a Failure of Risk Management?, 10 J. ALT. INV.
91, 92 (2007) (analysing “the causes and details of the collapse of Amaranth.”); and other
massive hedge fund failures, such as Bailey Coates, Bayou Management, Cromwell Fund,
Philadelphia Alternative Asset Management, Marin Capital, Aman Capital Global, Tiger
Funds, Eifuku Master Trust, Lyceum Capital, and Wood River Partners. See MARK JICKLING
& ALISON A. RAAB, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33746, HEDGE FUND FAILURES 5–9 (2006).
2. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. Of Governors of the U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 2006 Financial Markets Conference: Hedge
Funds and Systemic Risk (May 16, 2006) [hereinafter Bernanke Speech 2006], available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bernanke20060516a.htm (“Following the
LTCM crisis and the publication of the Working Group’s recommendations, the debate about
hedge funds and the broader effects of their activities on financial markets abated for a time.
That debate, however, has now resumed with vigor—spurred, no doubt, by the creation of
many new funds, large reported inflows to funds, and a broadening investor base. Renewed
discussion of hedge funds and of their benefits and risks has in turn led to calls for authorities
to implement new policies, many of which will be topics of this conference. . . . Authorities’
primary task is to guard against a return of the weak market discipline that left major market
participants overly vulnerable to market shocks. Continued focus on counterparty risk management is likely the best course for addressing systemic concerns related to hedge funds.”);
Regulation of Hedge Funds: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 31 (2006) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC) (“[H]ad the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York not intervened to organize a $3.6 billion bailout by the
fund’s creditor banks, the bankruptcy of LTCM ‘could have potentially impaired the economies of many nations, including our own.’ ”).
3. See generally Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation: Retailization, Regulation, and
Investor Suitability, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 581 (2009); Registration Under the Advisers
Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,058 (Dec. 10, 2004) (codified as
amended at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 & 279) (“Investors that have not been traditional hedge fund
investors, including pension plans that have millions of beneficiaries, are thus today purchasing hedge funds. As a result of the participation by these entities in hedge funds, the assets of
these entities are exposed to the risks of hedge fund investing. Losses resulting from hedge
fund investing and hedge fund frauds may affect the entities’ ability to satisfy their obligations to their beneficiaries or pursue other intended purposes.”); Nicholas Chan et al., Systemic Risk and Hedge Funds (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11200,
2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11200 (“[S]ince the collapse of Long Term
Capital Management in 1998, it has become clear that hedge funds are also involved in systemic risk exposures. The hedge-fund industry has a symbiotic relationship with the banking
sector, and many banks now operate proprietary trading units that are organized much like
hedge funds. As a result, the risk exposures of the hedge fund industry may have a material
impact on the banking sector, resulting in new sources of systemic risks.”); see also Nomination of William H. Donaldson: Hearing on Nomination of William H. Donaldson, of New
York, To Be a Member of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Before the S. Comm.
on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 37 (2003) (statement of William H. Don-
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increased demands for heightened supervision for the private fund industry.5 During6 and after the financial crisis, many commentators blamed
the private fund industry for taking excessive risks that destabilized the
economy and contributed to the financial crisis.7 Only a minority of scholars opined that private funds were not to blame.8 More recent studies
suggest that private funds may destabilize financial markets.9
aldson), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg90929/pdf/CHRG108shrg90929.pdf (describing the retailization of hedge funds as a “distressing move”). But
see STAFF REPORT TO THE U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF
HEDGE FUNDS 80 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf
(“[T]he staff has not uncovered evidence of significant numbers of retail investors investing
directly in hedge funds.”).
4. Majed R. Muhtaseb & Chun Chun “Sylvia” Yang, Portraits of Five Hedge Fund
Fraud Cases, 15 J. FIN. CRIME 179, 180 (2008) (identifying fraud committed by hedge funds);
Franklin R. Edwards, New Proposals to Regulate Hedge Funds: SEC Rule 203(b)(3)-2 1–18
(APEC Study Center, Columbia Univ. Discussion Paper No. 35, 2004), available at http://
www8.gsb.columbia.edu/apec/sites/apec/files/files/discussion/35EdwardsHedge.pdf (examining the Commission’s new proposal to address its current concerns about hedge funds, rule
203(b)(3)-2, which would require the registration of most advisers to hedge funds with the
SEC); Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at
72,078 (“Registration allows us to conduct examinations of hedge fund advisers, and our
examinations provide a strong deterrent to advisers’ fraud, identify practices that may harm
investors, and lead to earlier discovery of fraud that does occur.”).
5. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed.
Reg. at 72,077, 72,080.
6. Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk in the Financial Markets: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Rep. Bauchus); id. at 8 (statement of
E. Gerald Corrigan, Managing Director, Goldman Sachs & Company); Jón Danı́elsson &
Jean-Pierre Zigrand, Regulating Hedge Funds, 10 FIN. STABILITY REV. 29, 30 (2007) (“Hedge
funds do . . . contribute to systemic risk whereby the failure of a systemically important hedge
fund has the potential to create sufficient uncertainty in the markets for liquidity to dry up
and for trading to cease with potentially costly consequences.”).
7. 155 CONG. REC. 30,851 (2009) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) (“[The DoddFrank Act will] provide[ ] more transparency and tougher regulation of hedge funds, private
equity firms, and credit rating agencies, whose seal of approval gave way to excessively risky
practices that led to a financial collapse.”).
8. See Andrew W. Lo, Regulatory Reform in the Wake of the Financial Crisis of 20072008, 1 J. FIN. ECON. POL’Y 4, 16 (2009) (“While the shadow banking system has no doubt
contributed to systemic risk in the financial industry, hedge funds have played only a minor
role in the current financial crisis, as evidenced by the lack of attention they have received in
the government’s recent bailout efforts.”); Roberta Romano, Against Financial Regulation
Harmonization: A Comment 3 (Yale Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 414, 2010), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1697348 (“[T]here is an absence of evidence pointing to hedge funds as a contributing factor in the recent financial panic.”). See
also Stephen Brown et al., Hedge Funds After Dodd-Frank, NYU STERN SCH. BUS. (July 19,
2010, 3:41 PM), http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/blogs/regulatingwallstreet/2010/07/hedge-funds-afterdoddfrank.html (assessing hedge funds’ lack of contribution to systemic risk in general and
during the recent crisis).
9. See infra Part II; see, e.g., Reint Gropp, How Important Are Hedge Funds in a
Crisis?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F. ECONOMIC LETTER 4 (Apr. 4, 2014), http://
www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2014/april/hedge-fund-riskmeasurement-spillover-economic-crisis/el2014-11.pdf (“[H]edge funds may play an even
more prominent role in transmitting shocks to the rest of the financial market, and thus may
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Partly in reaction to the systemic risk concerns posed by the private
fund industry,10 Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
amplify systemic risk more than previously thought.”). See also Tobias Adrian et al., Hedge
Fund Tail Risk, in QUANTIFYING SYSTEMIC RISK 155, 155 (Joseph G. Haubrich & Andrew
W. Lo eds., 2013) (“While hedge funds are liquidity providers in usual times, during times of
market crisis, they can be forced to delever, potentially contributing to market volatility.”);
Photis Lysandrou, The Primacy of Hedge Funds in the Subprime Crisis, 34 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 225, 227 (2012), http://mesharpe.metapress.com/link.asp?target=contribution&id
=54662412V246K31W (“Take away hedge funds and a general financial crisis could still have
occurred in 2007–8, but it is only because of the hedge funds that the crisis that actually
occurred initially took on the specific form of a subprime crisis.”); John Kambhu et al., Hedge
Funds, Financial Intermediation, and Systemic Risk 11–12, 291 FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y.
STAFF REP. 1, 7–9 (2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1003210 (“If
systemic risk is fundamentally about financial markets linkages to the real economy, then
hedge funds create systemic risk to the extent that they can disrupt the ability of financial
intermediaries or financial markets to efficiently provide credit. . . . [B]anks’ direct exposure
to hedge funds has been growing proportionately with the hedge fund industry itself.”); Andrew W. Lo, Hedge Funds, Systemic Risk, and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008: Written Testimony for the House Oversight Committee Hearing on Hedge Funds 10 (Nov. 13, 2008),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1301217 (“[O]ver the past
decade, these investors and funds have become central to the global financial system, providing loans, liquidity, insurance, risk-sharing, and other importan[t] services that used to be the
exclusive domain of banks. But unlike banks—which are highly regulated entities (but less
so, since the repeal of the Glass Steagall Act in 1999), with specific capital adequacy requirements and leverage and risk constraints—hedge funds and their investors are relatively unconstrained. . . . [Hedge funds] can also cause market dislocation in crowded markets with
participants that are not fully aware of or prepared for the crowdedness of their
investments.”).
10. Following the financial crisis, there were a number of calls both in the Department
of Treasury and Congress to create procedures to deal with the systemic risk posed by private
funds. See Perspectives on Hedge Fund Registration: Hearing on H.R. 711 Before the Subcomm. On Capital Mkt., Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. On Financial
Services, 111th Cong. 6 (2009) (statement of Rep. David Scott, Member, Subcomm. On Capital Mkt., Ins. and Gov’t Sponsored Enters.) (“It is of utmost importance that we continue to
assess systemic risk related to these funds, as well as how their processes might be improved
to ensure our financial markets are more secure in the future. Hedge funds indeed hold
unmatched sway over our markets, and I believe supervisors must have the necessary tools to
effectively monitor the systemic risk posed by hedge funds, improve market surveillance,
assure effective oversight, and improve transparency of the level of risk in the financial markets related to hedge funds.”); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN. REGULATORY REFORM:
A NEW FOUNDATION 3 (2009), available at http http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf (“Financial institutions that are critical to market functioning
should be subject to strong oversight . . . . We propose . . . [t]he registration of advisers of
hedge funds and other private pools of capital with the SEC.”). When Dodd-Frank was making its way through conference, the bill’s new regulatory controls to deal with private funds’
risks were mentioned by members as a reason to pass the legislation. 156 Cong. Rec. H5233,
at H5238 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Kanjorski) (“The bill that we are considering today contains a number of other worthwhile elements that should become law . . .
[such as] the registration of hedge fund managers and private equity fund advisers. To promote market integrity, we need those individuals who handle large sums of money and assets
to register with the SEC and provide information about their trades and portfolios. While I
remain concerned about the registration exemptions put in place by others during the legislative process, I believe that these reforms are necessary to improve the quality of regulation
and protect against systemic risk. While hedge funds may not have directly caused this latest
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Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the “Dodd-Frank Act”).11 The DoddFrank Act defines potential systemic risk posed by a U.S. or foreign nonbank financial entity as the “material financial distress at the [company],
or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix
of the activities of the [company that], could pose a threat to the financial
stability of the United States.”12
To address concerns about the private fund industry’s possible systemic
risk, the Dodd-Frank Act authorized the SEC to promulgate rules requiring registration and enhanced disclosure for private funds advisers,13 and
facilitating data collection to assess systemic risk. To fulfill its data collection obligations under the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC Division of Investment Management adopted a new form, Form PF.14 Form PF requires
private fund advisers to disclose their strategies, products, performance,
changes in performance, financing information, risks metrics, counterparties and credit exposure, percentage of assets traded using algorithms, and
the percentage of equity and debt, among others.15
The reporting requirements in Form PF are intended to enable
FSOC,16 a council of banking and securities regulators tasked with monitoring systemic risk in U.S. financial markets, to fulfill its mandate.17
financial crisis, we do know that these investment vehicles have previously contributed to
significant market instability, as was the case in the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998. Thus, this reform is an important step in understanding and controlling systemic risk.”).
11. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in various sections of 12
U.S.C.).
12. Id. at § 113(a)(1). See also W. Avery, Kathleen A. Scott & Lindsey Carson, DoddFrank Act Attempts to Curtail Systemic Risk, 127 BANKING L. J. 766, 768 (2010).
13. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 402–408, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5402–5408.
14. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.204(b)-1; Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds
and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, 76
Fed. Reg. 71,128 (Nov. 16, 2011) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 & 279); SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, OMB No. 3235-0679, FORM PF, REPORTING FORM FOR INVESTMENT ADVISERS TO PRIVATE FUNDS AND CERTAIN COMMODITY POOL OPERATORS AND COMMODITY
TRADING ADVISORS (2011) [hereinafter FORM PF], available at http://www.sec.gov/about/
forms/formpf.pdf; SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OMB No. 3235-0049, FORM ADV, UNIFORM APPLICATION FOR INVESTMENT ADVISER REGISTRATION AND REPORT BY EXEMPT REPORTING
ADVISERS [hereinafter FORM ADV], available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/
formadv.pdf.
15. FORM PF, supra note 14.
16. Dodd-Frank Act § 112(a)(2)(A) (authorizing FSOC to collect information to support its functions); Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, 76 Fed. Reg. at
71,128–71,132 (establishing FSOC to monitor and assess risks to the U.S. financial system
and to promote financial stability); id. at 71,142 (“Form PF has been designed to collect
information to assist FSOC in monitoring and assessing systemic risks that private funds may
pose . . . .”).
17. Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool
Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, 76 Fed. Reg. at 71,129; see also
Dodd-Frank Act § 112(a)(1)(A)–(C) (“The purposes of the Council are—(A) to identify
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FSOC was created under the Dodd-Frank Act18 with the mandate to correct perceived regulatory weaknesses that may have contributed to the financial crisis of 2008–2009, including the insufficient supervision of large
non-bank financial institutions, the complexity of financial institutions,
and the lack of coordination among financial regulators.19 The data collected via Form PF has been tailored primarily for the use of FSOC.20 The
purpose of Form PF is not only to collect the necessary data to aid in the
process of designating systemically significant financial institutions, but
also to provide FSOC with information necessary to assess the risk of the
private fund industry within the financial system as a whole.21
Several observations from previous studies and anecdotal evidence
suggest that the mandated data collection in Form PF could create issues
for FSOC in evaluating the systemic risk of private funds.22 Despite overrisks to the financial stability of the United States that could arise from the material financial
distress or failure, or ongoing activities, of large, interconnected bank holding companies or
nonbank financial companies, or that could arise outside the financial services marketplace;
(B) to promote market discipline, by eliminating expectations on the part of shareholders,
creditors, and counterparties of such companies that the Government will shield them from
losses in the event of failure; and (C) to respond to emerging threats to the stability of the
United States financial system.”); EDWARD V. MURPHY & MICHAEL B. BERNIER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R42083, FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL: A FRAMEWORK TO
MITIGATE SYSTEMIC RISK (2011), available at http://www.llsdc.org/assets/DoddFrankdocs/crsr42083.pdf (describing the mission, membership, and scope of FSOC and providing an analysis of FSOC-related policy issues Congress may face); Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward Tripartism in Financial Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621,
627 (2012) (explaining FSOC’s charge to monitor and regulate systemic risk “throughout the
entire U.S. financial sector”); Jason Rudderman, Article, Eliminating Wall Street’s Safety Net:
How a Systemic Risk Premium Can Solve “Too Big To Fail”, 11 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 39, 46
(2012) (describing the responsibilities tasked to FSOC).
18.

Dodd-Frank Act § 111.

19. See generally, MURPHY & BERNIER, supra note 17, at 1–2; Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. Of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the 47th Annual Conference on
Bank Structure and Competition: Implementing a Macroprudential Approach to Supervision
and Regulation (May 5, 2011) [hereinafter Bernanke Speech 2011], available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110505a.htm; Emerich Gutter, TooBig-to-Fail and the Financial Stability Oversight Council, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. (DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKING AND FINANCIAL LAW: 2010) 73 (2010); Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in Financial Regulation, 101 CAL. L. REV. 327, 369–70 (2013);
EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43087, WHO REGULATES WHOM AND
HOW? AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY POLICY FOR BANKING AND SECURITIES MARKETS 29 (2013), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/
1148/.
20. See Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity
Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, 76 Fed. Reg. at 71,129, 71,130
(suggesting that SEC would not necessarily have required the same level of reporting had the
information reported on Form PF been intended for the sole use of the SEC).
21. Securities/Section 20/Broker-Dealer, in 30 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y RE26, 26 (Dec. 2011).

PORT

22. See Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act,
50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 244, 260 (2013) [hereinafter Kaal, Registration]; Wulf A. Kaal, The
Effect of Private Fund Disclosures Under the Dodd-Frank Act 1–2 (June 7, 2014) (forthcom-
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all acceptance of Form PF by the private fund industry, the core challenges
for the SEC in Form PF include: the ambiguity of several questions on
Form PF, private fund advisers’ disagreement with the definition of funds
in Form PF and corresponding insufficiency of SEC guidance, insufficiency
of private fund advisers’ existing reporting systems, and challenges in aggregating the required Form PF data.23
This Article evaluates the feasibility of FSOC’s assessments of private
funds’ systemic risk in light of the identified core challenges for Form PF.
Part I provides a basic overview of the ideas presented in this Article and
introduces the debate over the systemic risk of private funds. Part II introduces the debate and literature on the systemic risk of private funds.
After a short introduction of the history of private fund transparency in
the United States, Part III describes the legal requirements and private
fund advisers’ data collection obligations under the SEC’s Form PF before
assessing FSOC’s utilization of Form PF data in Part IV. In Part V, the
author introduces evidence from prior empirical studies suggesting that
the data reported by private funds in Form PF could be suboptimal. Based
on this finding, the author evaluates possible challenges for the systemic
risk analysis performed FSOC and the SEC as it pertains to private funds.
Part IV concludes.
II. SYSTEMIC RISK

OF

PRIVATE FUNDS

The debate on private funds’ systemic risk has taken place primarily in
two major phases. In what can be considered the first phase, the 1998
collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) and the bailout
orchestrated by the New York Federal Reserve Bank triggered a major
scholarly debate on the systemic risk of private funds.24 Some argued that
the proliferation of private funds in combination with their risk/reward
profile made such funds systemically risky.25 Others argued that private
funds can create market events such as the LTCM failure, which in turn
can lead to global financial crises if many highly leveraged funds with illiquid portfolios are obligors of a small number of major financial institutions.26 In addition to posing a direct systemic risk by damaging
systemically important financial institutions, private funds can also pose an
ing) [hereinafter Kaal, Disclosure], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2447306.
23. Kaal, Disclosure, supra note 22, at 38; see also Kaal, Registration, supra note 22, at
263.
24. See Bernanke Speech 2006, supra note 2; see generally supra note 1.
25. Nicholas Chan et al., Do Hedge Funds Increase Systemic Risk?, 91 FED. RES. BANK
OF ATLANTA ECON. REV. 49 (2006), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/
erq406_lo.pdf.
26. See Nicholas Chan et al., Systemic Risk and Hedge Funds, in THE RISKS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 235, 236 (Mark Carey and René M. Stulz eds., 2007) (pointing to the
importance of liquidity and leverage as two key themes post-LTCM because leverage can
turn small losses into large losses and the more illiquid a portfolio is, the larger the impact of
forced liquidations).
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indirect threat to the financial system by generating a liquidity shock and
increasing market volatility in key markets.27 Others emphasized the
combination of leverage and the complexity of private funds’ transactions
employing derivative instruments and non-exchange traded derivative instruments as the main concerns in the field of private funds’ systemic
risk.28 Private funds’ systemic risk is mainly the result of their pursuit of
aggressive investment strategies and a significant level of leverage in combination with adverse fluctuations in market prices that can dry up credit
and negatively affect the market price of collateral.29
The 2008–2009 global financial crisis precipitated a second major wave
of scholarship about the possible systemic risk implications of private
funds.30 The unprecedented growth of the private fund industry leading
27. MICHAEL R. KING & PHILIPP MAIER, HEDGE FUNDS AND FINANCIAL STABILITY:
THE STATE OF THE DEBATE iii (Bank of Can., Discussion Paper 2007-9, 2007), available at
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/dp07-9.pdf (“[W]hile the potential
for a systemic risk from the hedge fund sector is considered small, the potential for damage
from such shocks may have increased due to the increased spread, complexity, and tighter
linkages of the global financial system. Going forward, the relationship between large complex financial institutions and hedge funds must be monitored closely. In terms of policy,
direct regulation that increases transparency – whether of counterparty exposures or trading
positions – does not appear feasible, may create a moral-hazard problem, and may reduce
overall market efficiency. Indirect regulation via prime brokers, market discipline, and improved risk management practices are the most promising approaches for addressing potential risks from the hedge fund sector.”).
28. Hedge Funds and the Financial Market: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight
and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 15-24 (2008) (statement of Professor David S. Ruder, Northwestern University School of Law); see generally id.
29. Anita I. Anand, Is Systemic Risk Relevant to Securities Regulation?, 60 U. TOL.J. 941, 956 (2010).

RONTO

30. See, e.g., FIN. SERVS. AUTH., ASSESSING THE POSSIBLE SOURCES OF SYSTEMIC RISK
HEDGE FUNDS (2012), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/hedge-fundreport-aug2012.pdf; Tobias Adrian et al., Financial Stability Monitoring FED. RES. BANK OF
N.Y. STAFF REP. No. 601, 2013; Gropp, supra note 9 at 1; Maria Stromqvist, Hedge Funds
and Their Impact on Systemic Stability, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HEDGE FUNDS, PRIVATE EQUITY AND ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS 309 (Phoebus Athanassiou ed., 2012); David
Easley et al., Opaque Trading, Disclosure, and Asset Prices: Implications for Hedge Fund
Regulation, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 1190 (2013); Gregory W. Brown et al., Are Hedge Funds
Systemically Important?, 20 J. DERIVATIVES 8 (2012); Stephen J. Brown et al., Systemic Risk
and Cross-Sectional Hedge Fund Returns (Working Paper, Apr. 30, 2013), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2242685; Markus K. Brunnermeier & Martin
Oehmke, Bubbles, Financial Crises, and Systemic Risk (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 18398, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w18398.pdf?new_window=1; Barbara Novick, Systemic Risk and Asset Management: Improving the Financial Ecosystem for All Market Participants (Harvard L. Sch. EU-US Symposium,
Concept Paper, Mar. 2014), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/pifs/
symposia/europe/2014-europe/hls-symposium—-b-novick—-final.pdf; Lloyd Dixon et al.,
Hedge Funds, Systemic Risk, and Dodd-Frank: The Road Ahead, RAND CTR. FOR CORPORATE ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE (2013), http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/
CF308.html; Laura Zakaras, Do Hedge Funds Pose a Systemic Risk to the Economy?, RAND
CTR. FOR CORPORATE ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE (2012), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research
_briefs/RB9680/index1.html.
FROM
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up to the financial crisis was a significant factor with knock-on effects in
the changing assessment of the role of private funds’ systemic risk after the
financial crisis. According to some estimates, private funds surpassed
banks in size and importance during and after the financial crisis.31 The
unprecedented growth in the private fund industry in combination with
the low interest rate environment following the Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing after the financial crisis of 2008–2009 resulted in private fund
managers’ increasingly “reaching for yield”.32 The use of leverage and
complex financial transactions including derivatives to increase private
fund advisers’ yield expectations further increased private funds’ systemic
risk.33
Given the changing conditions for private funds, scholars evaluated
several additional factors as possible sources of systemic risk in the finan31.

OFFICE OF FIN. RES., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ASSET MANAGEMENT AND STA1 (2013) [hereinafter OFR], available at http://financialresearch.gov/reports/files/
ofr_asset_management_and_financial_stability.pdf (“The U.S. asset management industry
oversees the allocation of approximately $53 trillion in financial assets (see Figure 1).”); Sam
Fleming, Asset Managers Pose a Risk to Stability, BoE Warns, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2014, 11:46
AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d84aae26-bbda-11e3-84f1-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2zj
Wtcd00 (quoting Andrew Haldane, a member of the BOE’s Financial Policy Committee:
“although asset managers did not pose the same risks for stability as banks, their size could
still damage financial markets. He said the industry, which collects $87tn globally, has the
potential to cause frictions in markets such as via asset fire-sales.”); Chris Flood, Debate Over
Fund Market Risks Grows, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014, 9:47 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
dd87b69c-bb38-11e3-948c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2zjWtcd00; Huw Jones, BoE’s Haldane
Says Funds Can Also Be ‘Too Big to Fail’, REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2014, 3:26 PM), http://
uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/04/uk-boe-funds-haldane-idUKBREA330EW20140404; Andrew G. Haldane, Chief Economic, Bank of Eng., Address at the London Business School:
The Age of Asset Management (Apr. 4, 2014) (transcript available at http://
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2014/speech723.pdf).
BILITY

32. OFR, supra note 31, at 9; Renee Haltom, Reaching for Yield: Are the Fed’s Low
Interest Rate Policies Pushing Investors Toward Risk?, ECON FOCUS, Third Quarter 2013, at
5, available at http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/econ_focus/ (“Not only
have short-term rates been lower and for a longer period than in any episode since the Great
Depression, but long-term rates are remarkably low as well, thanks to the Fed’s unconventional monetary policies like quantitative easing and “Operation Twist”. For the world’s biggest bond investors, returns have been squeezed at all parts of the yield curve. This time,
some Fed policymakers have also voiced concerns about reaching for yield. Fed Governor
Jeremy Stein has been the most vocal detailing what he views as causes of excessive risk in a
February speech, and Bernanke and Vice Chair Janet Yellen have said that the Fed is watching the issue.”).
33. U.K. Fin. Conduct Auth., Hedge Fund Survey 27 (March 2014), http://
www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/hedge-fund-survey.pdf; Letter from Jiøı́ Król, Deputy Chief
Exec. Officer, Alt. Inv. Mgmt. Ass’n, to the Secretariat of the Fin. Stability Bd., (April 7,
2014), http://www.aima.org/objects_store/assessment_methodologies_for_identifying_nbnig_sifis_-_response_to_consultation.pdf (“Based on available data, it is unlikely that, today, an
individual hedge fund or family of funds managed by a hedge fund manager could pose systemic risk: Although the hedge fund sector has grown in recent years, collectively, it remains
a small part of the financial sector as a whole, employing lower levels of leverage than the
banking sector, managing more liquid portfolios and capable of managing and stemming investor redemptions in stressed market conditions.”).
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cial system that may be associated with private fund advisers. Some of the
core factors identified in the literature included: redemption risk that
causes sudden reductions in funding to banks and other financial entities,
insufficient credit risk transfer to private fund managers, and contagion
through business relationships connecting private fund managers with
their sponsors.34
A large part of the post-crisis debate pertained to the role of the socalled shadow banking system in the global financial crisis, focusing in
large part on the possible systemic risk of private funds.35 Private fund
advisers can create funds that may function as a close substitute for the
money-like liabilities created by banks.36 Like banks, private fund advisers can provide liquidity to clients and to financial markets and engage in
various forms of liquidity transformation. The vulnerabilities created by
private fund advisers engaging in bank-like activities may have large implications for financial stability.37
Recognizing the increasing risk emanating from the private fund industry in the aftermath of the financial crisis, several governmental entities
and agencies issued reports on the question of the systemic risks posed by
private funds.38 The Office of Financial Research (OFR) identified several activities of private fund managers as important threats to the finan34. Elias Bengtsson, Fund Management and Systemic Risk – Lessons from the Global
Financial Crisis, 23 Fin. Markets, Institutions & Instruments 101, 105–06 (2014), available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fmii.12016/abstract; Glenn Hubbard, Financial
Regulatory Reform: A Progress Report, 95 Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis Rev. 181, 189 (2013),
available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/13/03/181-198Hubbard.pdf
(“[S]ome hedge funds may pose a systemic risk to the financial system. A very large, unsustainably leveraged fund exposes a number of large financial institutions to increased
counterparty risk.”).
35. See Jing-Zhi Huang & Ying Wang, Hedge Funds and the Financial Crisis, in ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS: INSTRUMENTS, PERFORMANCE, BENCHMARKS, AND STRATEGIES
521 (H. Kent Baker & Greg Filbeck eds., 2013); see also Anita K. Krug, Financial Regulatory
Reform and Private Funds 2 (Berkeley Ctr. for Law, Bus. and the Econ., White Paper, 2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1682623 (“More indirectly,
prevalent sentiment has it that there exists a ‘shadow’ banking system[ ] — a swath of financial institutions that are unregulated but that engage in activities that regulated financial
institutions engage in — and that, given the lack of regulatory oversight, the activities within
the shadow banking system, perhaps more than the activities of regulated financial institutions, contribute to systemic risk. Typically included as participants of this shadow banking
system are affiliates of brokerage firms, insurance companies, and other regulated entities,
along with private investment funds, including hedge funds and private equity funds.”).
36. OFR, supra note 31, at 1.
37. Id. (“Some activities highlighted in this report that could create vulnerabilities—if
improperly managed or accompanied by the use of leverage, liquidity transformation, or
funding mismatches—include risk-taking in separate accounts and reinvestment of cash collateral from securities lending.”).
38. See, e.g., OFR, supra note 31; FIN. STABILITY BD. & INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’S,
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES FOR IDENTIFYING NON-BANK
NON-INSURER GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2014) [hereinafter FSB & IOSCO], available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD435.pdf; FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT (2013),

Spring 2015]

Systemic Risk of Private Funds

173

cial system, including “reaching for yield”, herding, responding to
investors’ frequent or large-scale redemption requests, and “fire sales” of
assets in a liquidity crunch.39 Similarly, the Financial Stability Board
(FSB) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO) issued a Consultative Document suggesting a set of methods for
the identification of globally active systemically important investment
funds.40 The OFR, FSB, and IOSCO reports provide reasons explaining
why globally active investment funds should be designated as systemically
important, but differ on what specific entities in the fund structure should
be considered for the systemic assessment.41 Although the proposed designation criteria are similar, the FSB and IOSCO emphasize the assessment of systemic importance at the fund-level, while the OFR suggests
systemic assessment at the asset manager-level with all funds combined.42
In contrast with the OFR, FSB, and IOSCO, the Financial Services
Authority (FSA) in the United Kingdom concluded in its first comprehensive survey of London’s private fund industry that the private fund industry poses no systemic risk to the financial system.43 The FSA’s report
caused widespread industry endorsements.44 The Australian Securities
and Investment Commission concurred in its assessment, concluding that
the private fund industry posed no systemic concerns.45
available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-reports/Pages/2013-Annual-Re
port.aspx. For further analysis of FSOC’s evaluation of systemic risk, see Part III below.
39.

OFR, supra note 31, at 2.

40. FSB & IOSCO, supra note 38, at 3 (identifying exposures / counterparty channel
and asset liquidation / market channel as the two systemic risk transmission channels for
investment funds).
41.

See OFR, supra note 31, at 27–28; FSB & IOSCO, supra note 38, at 13–37.

42.

See OFR, supra note 31, at 1; FSB & IOSCO, supra note 38, at 1.

43.

U.K. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., ASSESSING POSSIBLE SOURCE OF SYSTEMIC RISK FROM
HEDGE FUNDS: A REPORT ON THE FINDINGS OF THE HEDGE FUND AS COUNTERPARTY SURVEY AND HEDGE FUND SURVEY 12 (2010) (“[M]ajor hedge funds did not pose a potentially
destabilising credit counterparty risk across the surveyed banks. HFS data shows a relatively
low level of ‘leverage’ under our various measures and suggests a contained level of risk from
hedge funds at that time. [O]ur analysis revealed no clear evidence to suggest that, from the
banks and hedge fund managers surveyed, any individual fund posed a significant systemic
risk to the financial system at the time”). Cf INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, REPORT ON THE
SECOND IOSCO HEDGE FUND SURVEY 25 (Oct., 2013), http://www.iosco.org/library/
pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD427.pdf (“[I]t has not been possible at this stage to draw definitive
conclusions relating to the systemic importance of the global hedge fund industry as a
whole . . . .”).
44. ’Europe’s Hedge Fund Industry Does Not Pose Systemic Risk, ALT. INV. MGMT.
ASS’N (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.aima.org/en/media/press-releases.cfm/id/F688E5B9-17B0415A-800B2EC217FEB585 (“The Alternative Investment Management Association (AIMA)
– the global hedge fund industry association – has welcomed the hedge fund survey published
by the UK’s Financial Services Authority which concluded that the industry does not pose a
systemic risk and features relatively low levels of leverage.”).
45.
TOR AND

AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N, REPORT 370: THE AUSTRALIAN HEDGE FUNDS SECSYSTEMIC RISK 5 (2013), http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1344416/rep370-pub
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Critics of the assessments used to examine the private fund industry46
have suggested that private fund advisers are unlikely to trigger a systemic
event because losses in private investment funds are directly absorbed by
the multitude of investors and their equity capital.47 In the aftermath of
LTCM, regulators have “encouraged banks to monitor” their private fund
lished-10-September-2013.pdf (“The survey results indicate that Australian hedge funds do
not currently appear to pose a systemic risk to the Australian economy.”).
46. Letter from Stuart J. Kaswell, Exec. Vice President & Managing Dir., Gen. Counsel of the Managed Funds Assoc., to Secretariat of the Fin. Stability Bd., 1 (Apr. 7, 2014),
https://www.managedfunds.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/MFA-comment-letter-on-GSIFIassessment-methodologies.pdf (“In that regard, we generally support the FSB’s and IOSCO’s
efforts to develop quantitative-based metrics for establishing thresholds at which investment
funds might be considered to pose systemic risk, though we believe the FSB and IOSCO
should modify the proposed metrics, as discussed in more detail below.”); Luke Clancy,
IOSCO Report Exaggerates Hedge Fund Leverage, Critics Claim, HEDGE FUNDS REV. 5
(Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.risk.net/hedge-funds-review/news/2302823/iosco-report-exagger
ates-hedge-fund-leverage-critics-claim (“[M]arket participants claim the [IOSCO] figures are
overblown, largely because of the decision to consider derivatives exposures on a gross basis.”); ICI Responds to the FSB Consultation on Systemic Risk and Investment Funds, INV.
CO. INST. (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.ici.org/viewpoints/view_14_fsb_comment (“Designation
of regulated funds as ‘systemically important financial institutions’ (SIFIs), whether in the
United States or other jurisdictions, is neither necessary nor appropriate as a means to address concerns about stability of the global financial markets. The consequences of designating regulated funds would be highly adverse to the designated fund, its investors, the overall
fund marketplace, and fund investing at large.”); Hazel Bradford, SIFMA Study Responds to
Stability Oversight Council, PENSIONS & INV. (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.pionline.com/article
/20140410/ONLINE/140419999/sifma-study-responds-to-stability-oversight-council (“A study
released April 4 by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association’s asset management group, which looked at nine of the largest managers with $3.86 trillion in separate
account assets, found 99% of large separate accounts were invested in long-only strategies
and 53% were in passively managed index strategies. Less than 4% of the firms employ
leverage and less than 2% engage in securities lending. All of the responding firms monitor
counterparty risk, SIFMA found.”); Stephen A. Keen & C. Todd Gibson, United States: Systemic Risk and Asset Management: Progressing from Ignorance to Confusion, MONDAQ (Feb.
22, 2014), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/294868/asset+finance/Systemic+Risk+
And+Asset+Management+Progressing+From+Ignorance+To+Confusion (concluding that
the OFR report “engaged in purely speculative assessments that ignored fundamental characteristics of the asset management business.”); Emily Stephenson & Sarah N. Lynch, U.S.
Senators Slam Study on Systemic Risks Posed by Asset Managers, REUTERS (Jan. 24, 2014,
3:28 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/24/us-financial-regulation-asset-idUSBREA0N1LG20140124 (“Five U.S. senators slammed a government report that raised red
flags about risks posed by asset management firms in a letter to Treasury Secretary Jack Lew
that was dated Thursday. The bipartisan group said the September study mischaracterized
the asset management industry and in some places relied on faulty information, and that the
report could threaten the credibility of the Treasury Department unit that published it . . . .
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, which oversees asset managers, asked for
public feedback on the study, a sign that it disagreed with the OFR’s findings. The OFR did
the research with little input from the SEC and, as a new agency, has struggled to obtain data
it needs in some cases, Reuters has reported.”).
47. Peter J. Wallison, Unrisky Business: Asset Management Cannot Create Systemic
Risk, AM. ENTER. INST. (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.aei.org/outlook/economics/financial-ser
vices/banking/unrisky-business-asset-management-cannot-create-systemic-risk/.
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adviser clients through limitations on leverage.48 The lack of financial
market repercussion after the Amaranth failure seems to suggest that this
approach was successful.49
III. PRIVATE FUND TRANSPARENCY

UNDER THE

DODD-FRANK ACT

Prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, private fund
advisers were largely exempt from the securities laws, provided that they
limited the sale of their securities to a certain number of accredited investors,50 did not advertise or otherwise hold themselves out to the public,
and constrained the resale of their securities.51 After more than sixty
years of limited regulatory constraints, despite several failed attempts by
48. Roger Ferguson & David Laster, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk, 10 FIN. STABILREV. 45, 45 (2007) available at http://www.banquefrance.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/banque
_de_france/publications/Revue_de_la_stabilite_financiere/etud5_0407.pdf; see also Wulf A.
Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation via Basel III, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 395 (2011) (suggesting that indirect regulation of hedge funds through their relationships with banks could
sufficiently curtail the hedge fund industry).
ITY

49.

Ferguson & Laster, supra note 48, at 45; see Romano, supra note 8, at 3–4.

50. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5) (2010) (providing a safe harbor under § 4(2) of the Securities Act and defining an “accredited investor” as a person with a net worth of more than
$1 million); see 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)–(6) (2010) (defining the term “accredited investor”
as a natural person whose individual net worth exceeded $1 million at the time of the
purchase, or whose individual income exceeded $200,000 in each of the two most recent years
and who had a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the year of
investment); see also SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (holding that investors who met the Regulation D criteria qualified to invest in hedge funds because they could
“fend for themselves”). However, in August 2007, the SEC dramatically expanded fraud protection for investors after its defeat in attempting to require hedge fund registration. See
Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 44,756,
44,757 (Aug. 9, 2007) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275) (“The rule prohibits advisers
from (i) making false or misleading statements to investors or prospective investors in hedge
funds and other pooled investment vehicles they advise, or (ii) otherwise defrauding these
investors.”); Prohibition of Fraud by Advisors to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 404 (proposed
Jan. 4, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230 and 275) (“[M]any individual investors today
may be eligible to make investments in privately offered investment pools as accredited investors that previously may not have qualified as such for those investments.”).
51. See Kaal, supra note 48, at 422 (summarizing hedge fund regulation before the
Dodd-Frank Act). Hedge funds, for the most part, limited the sale of their securities to
accredited investors to remain exempt from registration and supervision. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.501(a)(5) (providing a safe harbor under § 4(2) of the Securities Act and defining an
“accredited investor” as a person with a net worth of more than $1 million). The SEC proposed amending Regulation D, noting that inflation might have eroded the significance of a
$1 million net worth as good indication of investor sophistication. See Prohibition of Fraud by
Advisors to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. at 405 (proposing two steps for determining whether an
investors would be accredited: (1) whether the individual meets the test in rule 501(a) or rule
215 and (2) whether the individual “owns at least $2.5 million in investments”). But see Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. at 44,756 n.2
(deferring consideration of proposed change to definition of “accredited investor”).
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the SEC to register private funds,52 Congress enacted the Private Fund
Investment Adviser Registration Act (PFIARA) under Title IV of the
Dodd-Frank Act.53
To end the speculative trading practices and close alleged regulatory
gaps that may have contributed to the 2008 financial market crisis,54
PFIARA, by amending the Investment Advisers Act (IAA), gave the SEC
authority to issue rules and regulations for the registration of private funds
with the SEC,55 increasing record keeping and disclosure.56 Private fund
advisers with more than $150 million assets under management (AUM)57
are required to register as investment advisers and have to disclose systemically relevant information to the SEC.58 Motivated by a desire to cur52. See generally Kaal. Registration, supra note 22, at 249 (providing background and
historical perspective on private fund regulation under PFIARA).
53. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, §§ 401–419, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
54. See Tom Braithwaite, U.S. Senate Passes Financial Reform, FIN. TIMES (July 16,
2010, 1:01 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6b9d4542-9026-11df-ad26-00144feab49a.html#
axzz2DrwfWezl (“The financial reform legislation approved by Congress today represents a
welcome and far-reaching step toward preventing a replay of the recent financial crisis.”
(quoting Ben Bernanke) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
55.

Dodd-Frank Act § 406 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 80b-11).

56. See Dodd-Frank Act § 408 (“The Commission shall require investment advisers
exempted by reason of this subsection to maintain such records and provide to the Commission such annual or other reports as the Commission determines necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.”).
57. Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 76 Fed.
Reg. 42,950, 42,955 (July 19, 2011) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275, 279); see also id.
(The IAA defined Regulatory Assets Under Management (RAUM) as “the ‘securities portfolios’ with respect to which an adviser provides ‘continuous and regular supervisory or management services.’ ”) (quoting Advisers Act § 203A(a)(3)); see also id. at 42,956 (under
revised Form ADV, advisers must report their gross RAUM rather than net; this means they
will no longer be able to deduct outstanding debt or other accrued but unpaid liabilities from
their totals. To increase consistency, revised Form ADV also gives investment advisers less
room to exercise discretion in counting or excluding assets from RAUM.); see also DoddFrank Act § 404 (giving the SEC authority to require reporting and record keeping for assets
carrying systemic risk).
58. FORM ADV, supra note 14, pt. 1A, at 5 (requiring exempt reporting advisers to
check that they qualify for an exemption from registration: (i) “as an adviser solely to one or
more venture capital funds” or (ii) because they act “solely as an adviser to private funds and
have assets under management in the United States of less than $150 million”); see DoddFrank Act § 408 (“The Commission shall provide an exemption from the registration requirements under this section to any investment adviser of private funds, if each of such investment adviser acts solely as an adviser to private funds and has assets under management in
the United States of less than $150,000,000.”); see also Dodd-Frank Act § 403 (striking private adviser exemption under section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act, thereby precluding
many private fund advisers from avoiding registration); Rules Implementing Amendments to
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,950, 42,955 (“We are adopting revisions
to the instructions to Part 1A of Form ADV to implement a uniform method for advisers to
calculate assets under management that will be used under the Act for regulatory purposes in
addition to assessing whether an adviser is eligible to register with the Commission.”); Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers With Less Than $150
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tail those who operate in the shadows of U.S. markets,59 prevent fraud,
limit systemic risk, and provide information to investors,60 Congress authorized the SEC to collect information from registered private fund advisers. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC is also required to set up
rules for the registration and reporting of private fund managers who were
previously exempt from registration.61
The PFIARA also requires registered private fund advisers to maintain
records and any other information the SEC and the systemic risk regulators may deem necessary and appropriate to avoid systemic risk.62 Private
fund advisers are required to file confidential reports with the SEC pertaining to information related to systemic risk.63 Required disclosures in
such reports include counterparty credit risk exposures, valuation policies,
trading practices, the amount of AUM, side letters, the use of leverage,
including off-balance sheet leverage, and other information deemed
necessary.64
1. Private Fund Adviser Registration and Disclosure
To implement the registration requirements under PFIARA, the SEC
amended Form ADV, a disclosure document with periodic amendments,65
to require any investment adviser registering with the SEC to file Form
ADV.66 Amended Form ADV requires registered investment advisers
Million in Assets Under Management, and Foreign Private Advisers, 76 Fed. Reg. 39,646,
39,666 (July 6, 2011) (codified as amended 17 C.F.R. pt. 275) (providing an exemption from
registration for advisers with less than $150 million in private fund assets under management
in the United States); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM ADV: INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 1A,
at 6–9 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv-instructions.pdf (explaining how to calculate regulator y assets under management).
59. 155 CONG. REC. 30,824 (2009) (statement of Rep. Kanjorski).
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

156 CONG. REC. S5925–26 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Durbin).
Dodd-Frank Act § 404.
Id. at §§ 404–405, § 404(b)(1)(A).
Id. § 404(b)(3).
Id.
FORM ADV, supra note 14.

66. Id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 279.1 (2012) (establishing filing requirements for Form
ADV); James F. Koehler & P. Wesley Lambert, Impact of the Dodd-Frank and Registration
Acts of 2010 on Investment Advisers, 13 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 29, 34–35 (2011); Marybeth Sorady et
al., Summary and Analysis of Dodd-Frank Rules for Investment Advisers: Registration Requirements, Exemptions, Family Offices, Performance Fee Eligibility, 12 J. INVEST. COMPLIANCE 4, 4 (2011); Michael P. Coakley & Matthew P. Allen, The New Form ADV Part 2 and
the “Plain English” Movement of the SEC, FINRA, and Michigan’s OFIR, 31 MICH. BUS. L.J.
19 (2011). Investment advisers that were registered with the SEC on January 1, 2012, were
required to file the amendment to Form ADV by March 30, 2012. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203A5(b) (2012); see also Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 76 Fed. Reg. 42, 950, 42,953, 42,954 (Jul. 19, 2011) (codified as amended 7 C.F.R pt.
275) (discussing rule 203A-5(b), which provides that SEC-registered advisers not required to
file an annual updating amendment between January 1, 2012, and March 30, 2012, will file an
other-than-annual amendment, but they will complete all of the items on Part 1A of Form
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and exempt reporting advisers67 to report to the SEC information regarding the private funds they manage.68 The required disclosures include information regarding the number and type of clients, including an
assessment of the percentage of AUM attributable to each client type,69
financial industry affiliations, non-advisory activities, the scope of services
provided, investment strategy, the fund structure, ownership, the gross asset value, and the adviser’s use of consultants and other gatekeepers.70
To help the SEC identify the entities and individuals with exposure to
private fund investments, advisers are required to provide information on
the type of clients they service, including high net worth individuals, investment companies, banks, charities, and insurance companies.71 Private
fund advisers must also identify the type of services they provide,72 the
type of compensation arrangements the adviser uses,73 and what percentage of the adviser’s total Regulatory Assets Under Management (RAUM)
is owned by a particular type of client.74
To help the SEC understand the respective adviser’s business and provide the SEC with relevant data, amended Form ADV also requires advisers to disclose their clients, employees, compensation arrangements, and
advisory activities.75 Required disclosures in this context include the numADV, not merely the items required to be updated in a typical other-than-annual
amendment).
67. FORM ADV, supra note 14, pt. 1A (requiring exempt reporting advisers to disclose
only a limited subset of items on Form ADV).
68. Id.
69. Id. at Item 5.C–D.
70. Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 42,965, 42,966 (requiring advisers to complete section 7.B.(1) of Schedule D for any
private fund that the adviser manages when, previously, Item 7 required advisers only to
complete section 7.B.(1) of Schedule D for “investment-related” limited partnerships or limited liability companies that the adviser or a related person advised); Id. at 42,965 (requiring,
in Part A of Section 7.B.(1), “an adviser to provide basic information regarding the size and
organizational, operational, and investment characteristics of each fund.”); Id. at 42,968 (requiring, in Part B of the same section, “advisors to report information concerning five types
of [private fund] service providers that generally perform important roles as ‘gatekeepers’ ”—which will both identify gatekeepers and give investors an idea of what kinds of roles
particular gatekeepers play); Id. (providing the example that advisers must indicate if a prime
broker has custody of fund assets); Id. at 42,965 (stating that information reported on this
section of Schedule D will be publicly available).
71. FORM ADV, supra note 14, at Item 5.D.(1).
72. Id. at Item 5.G.; see also id. at Item 5.H (requiring disclosures pertaining to the
number of clients the adviser provided with financial planning services); id. at Item 5.I (asking whether the adviser participates in a wrap fee program); id. at Item 5.J (asking whether
the adviser previously indicated that it provides investment advice only with respect to limited types of investments).
73. Id. at Item 5.E.
74. Id. at Item 5.D.(2).
75. Id. pt. 1A, at Item 5; see Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 76 Fed. Reg. at 42,970 (adopting amendments to Item 5 largely as they
were originally proposed, with only a few minor changes).
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ber of employees,76 the number of employees who perform advisory functions, the number of employees who are registered representatives of
broker-dealers, the number of employees who are registered with state
authorities as investment adviser representatives, the number of employees who are insurance agents,77 and the number of nonemployees—firms
or other persons—who solicit advisory clients on the adviser’s behalf.78
To avoid potential conflicts of interest between the different types of
businesses and services provided by private fund advisers,79 amended
Form ADV requires advisers to identify their types of business activity,80
whether one of those businesses is primary to the adviser,81 and whether
the adviser provides any services other than investment advice to advisory
clients.82 Advisers are also required to disclose transactions between advisers or related persons and clients because conflicts of interest may arise
in such transactions.83 Other required disclosures in this context include
compensation for client referrals,84 related-persons status of brokers and
76.

FORM ADV, supra note 14, pt. 1A, at Item 5.A.

77.

Id. at Item 5.B.

78. Id.; see also id. at Items 5.C, 5.H (specifically excluding as clients investors in private funds that the adviser advises unless that investor also has a separate advisory relationship with the adviser); Id. at Item 5.C.(1)–(2) (asking for the number of clients and what
percentage are non-U.S. persons).
79. See Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 76
Fed. Reg. at 42,970.
80. FORM ADV, supra note 14, pt. 1A, at Item 6.A (providing that business activities
include broker-dealer, futures commission merchant, real estate broker, banking, legal work,
or accounting).
81.

Id. at Item 6.B.(1)–(2).

82.

Id. at Item 6.B.(3) (asking the adviser to describe other products and services).

83. Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 42,971; FORM ADV, supra note 14, pt. 1A, at Item 8.A (requiring disclosure as to
whether the adviser or related person buys securities from or sells securities to advisory clients, buys securities for himself that he also recommends to advisory clients, or recommends
securities to advisory clients in which the adviser or related person has a proprietary ownership interest other than the two described immediately above); id. at Item 8.B (requiring
disclosure as to whether the adviser or related person acts as a broker-dealer or a registered
representative of a broker-dealer in securities trades for brokerage customers in which advisory client securities are sold or bought, recommends the purchase of securities for which the
adviser or related person is an underwriter, general or managing partner, or purchaser representative, or recommends purchase or sale of securities to advisory clients for which the adviser or any related person has any other sales interest); id. at Item 8.C (requiring disclosure
as to whether the adviser or related person has discretionary authority to determine what
securities should be sold on a client’s account or the amount of securities to be sold on that
account, to determine the broker or dealer to be used for purchases or sales for a client’s
account, or to determine the commission rates to be paid to a broker or dealer for a client’s
account).
84. Id. at Items 8.H–I; see Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 76 Fed. Reg. at 42,971, 42,972 (adopting three amendments to Item 8: (1) an
adviser who indicates that he has discretionary authority to determine brokers or dealers or
that recommends brokers or dealers must report whether any of those brokers or dealers are
related persons; (2) advisers receiving soft dollar benefits must report whether they are eligi-
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dealers,85 and research or other products and services in connection with
client transactions.86
2. Systemic Risk Data
To facilitate FSOC’s assessment of systemic risk that may result from
private fund activities in the financial system of the United States,87 the
Dodd-Frank Act authorized the SEC to collect the relevant data via Form
PF and tasked the SEC with providing the FSOC with the data collected
via Form PF.88 The SEC jointly developed Form PF with the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and in consultation with FSOC
members and several international regulators,89 but Form PF was primarily intended and drafted for use by FSOC.90 Form PF provides FSOC
ble for research or brokerage services under § 28(e) of the Exchange Act’s safe harbor; and
(3) an adviser must report whether it or its related person receives direct or indirect compensation for client referrals); see also FORM ADV, supra note 14, pt. 1A, at Items 8.C.3, 8.D–F,
8.G.(2); Commission Guidance Regarding Client Commission Practices Under Section 28(e)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-54165, 71 Fed. Reg.
41,978, 41,981, 41,982 (July 24, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2006/3454165fr.pdf (providing interpretive guidance in determining whether soft dollar benefits fit
under the safe harbor of § 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act).
85. FORM ADV, supra note 14, pt. 1A, at Items 8.D, 8.F.
86. Id. at Item 8.G.
87. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 404(7)(A), 124 Stat. 1376, 1571, 1573 (2010) (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. 80b-4)
(requiring under the PFIARA that the Commission make available to the Financial Stability
Oversight Council “copies of all reports, documents, records and information filed with or
provided to the Commission” by private equity and hedge fund advisers “as the Council may
consider necessary for the purpose of assessing the systemic risk posed by a private fund.”);
Charles K. Whitehead, Regulating for the Next Financial Crisis, 24 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL
BUS. & DEV. L.J. 3, 17-18 (2011) (“[I]nformation the SEC gathers can be provided to FSOC;
and, in principle, that should assist efforts to assess systemic risk. The principal regulator,
however, remains the SEC, with a rules-based (rather than prudential) approach to overseeing the industry.”). See generally Cheryl Nichols, Addressing Inept Sec Enforcement Efforts:
Lessons from Madoff, the Hedge Fund Industry, and Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act for U.S.
and Global Financial Systems, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 637, 683 (2011).
88. Dodd-Frank Act § 404(2);17 C.F.R. § 275.204(b)-1 (2012); Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity
Trading Advisors on Form PF, 76 Fed. Reg. 71,128, 71,140 (Nov. 16, 2011) (codified as
amended at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 & 279) (the Dodd-Frank Act amended section 204(b) of the
Advisers Act in effect requiring the SEC to establish reporting and recordkeeping requirements for private fund advisers); see also Dodd-Frank Act § 112; MURPHY & BERNIER, supra
note 17 (describing the mission, membership, and scope of FSOC and providing an analysis
of FSOC-related policy issues Congress may face).
89. John F. Atwood, Commission Adopts Form PF for Systemic Risk Reporting by
Private Funds, 2011-208 SEC FILINGS INSIGHT (CCH) (Nov. 3, 2011); Securities/Section 20/
Broker-Dealer, supra note 21, at 26; 17 C.F.R. § 275.204(b)-1 (2014) (requiring private fund
advisers to file Form PF with the SEC periodically); 17 C.F.R. § 4.27(d) (2014) (requiring
private fund advisers to file Form PF if they are registered as commodity pool operators or
commodity trading advisers).
90. Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool
Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, 76 Fed. Reg. at 71,129, 71,130.
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with information about the private fund industry to enable FSOC’s assessment of risks in the financial system and support FSOC’s mandate of
designating systemically significant financial institutions.91 Additionally,
Form PF filings can be utilized by the SEC and the CFTC for investigations and examinations.92 Although Form PF information contains private
fund advisers’ proprietary information and is considered confidential, the
Dodd-Frank Act authorized the SEC, upon request, to share Form PF
data with institutions that are also required to maintain confidentiality of
Form PF data, including FSOC, Congress, courts, federal departments,
and self-regulated organizations upon request.93
The SEC had broad expectations for the use of Form PF data. The
SEC expected Form PF data to help more fully evaluate and anticipate
issues with potential regulatory actions, allocate and reallocate resources,
and anticipate regulatory problems.94 The SEC also anticipated that Form
PF data would enhance its ability to develop and frame regulatory policies
pertaining to the private fund industry, private fund investment advisers,
and the markets in which they participate.95 Additionally, the SEC believed that Form PF data would help discern relationships between private
fund’s investment activities and regulatory actions.96
Form PF filing requirements apply to registered investment advisers
that hold $150 million RAUM or more attributable to private funds at the
end of their most recently completed fiscal year, are registered or are required to register with the SEC, and advise a single private fund or several
private funds.97 To take account of the relative risks of each type of pri91. Id.
92. “In addition to the primary purpose to assist FSOC in its assessment of systemic
risk, the Commission stated that it would use the information collected on Form PF in its
regulatory programs, including examinations, investigations, and investor protection efforts.”
SEC, ANNUAL STAFF REPORT RELATING TO THE USE OF DATA COLLECTED FROM PRIVATE
FUND SYSTEMIC RISK REPORTS 3 (2013) [HEREINAFTER SEC 2013], available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/studies/2013/im-annualreport-072513.pdf; see also Anita K. Krug, Institutionalization, Investment Adviser Regulation, and the Hedge Fund Problem, 63 HASTINGS L.J.
1, 27 (2011); Nichols, supra note 87, at 683.’
93. Barbara Crutchfield George & Lynn Vivian Dymally, The End of an Era of Limited Oversight: The Restructured Regulatory Landscape of Private Investment Funds Through
the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act and the E.U. Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive, 25
FLA. J. INT’L L. 207, 236 (2013).
94. Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool
Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, 76 Fed. Reg. at 155.
95. Id. at 71,132.
96. Id.
97. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204(b)-1 (2014). Most private fund advisers who meet these three
criteria will only be required to file Section 1 of Form PF. Reporting by Investment Advisers
to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors
on Form PF, 76 Fed. Reg. at 71,132. Remaining sections of Form PF will be filed by “ ‘Large
Private Fund Advisers.’ ” Id. at 71,132, 71,133. There are three types of Large Private Fund
Advisers: (1) “[a]ny adviser having at least $1.5 billion in [RAUM] attributable to hedge
funds as of the end of any month in the prior fiscal quarter;” (2) “[a]ny adviser managing a
liquidity fund having at least $1 billion in combined [RAUM] attributable to liquidity funds
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vate fund, the SEC takes a tiered approach to Form PF filing requirements.98 While smaller private fund advisers—those with less than $1.5
billion RAUM attributable to private funds—are required to complete
and file Form PF annually,99 large private fund advisers—those with at
least $1.5 billion RAUM attributable to private funds100—are require to
update their Form PF filings quarterly.101
Categories of required disclosures under Form PF include information
on the investment adviser, the funds managed by the investment adviser,
and information about individual investors,102 financing information, the
products used by the investment adviser, performance and changes in performance, risks metrics, strategies used, credit exposure, and positions
held by the investment adviser, among others.103 Form PF disclosure requirements pertaining to the investment advisers’ reporting funds advised
by investment advisers require a breakdown of Net Asset Value (NAV)
managed by the adviser by private fund strategy,104 and the percentage of
the reporting fund’s NAV managed by using computer-driven trading algorithms.105 Form PF also requires private fund advisers to disclose the
five trading counterparties to which the reporting fund has the greatest net
counterparty credit exposure,106 the name of the creditor, and the dollar
amount owed to each creditor.107 Other information required in this context includes information about the collateral and other credit support
counterparties posted to the respective reporting funds108 and changes in
and registered money market funds as of the end of any month in the prior fiscal quarter;”
and (3) “[a]ny adviser having at least $2 billion in [RAUM] attributable to private equity
funds as of the last day of the adviser’s most recently completed fiscal year.” Id. (footnotes
omitted).
98. Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool
Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, 76 Fed. Reg. 71,135, 71,136,
71,137.
99. Id. at 71,140; see also FORM PF, supra note 14, at General Instruction 9 (providing
different filing periods for different types of advisers).
100. See Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity
Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, 76 Fed. Reg. at 71,132, 71,133
(defining “large private fund adviser”).
101. Id. at 71,140; FORM PF, supra note 14, at General Instruction 9 (“[Y]ou [large
hedge fund advisers] must file a quarterly update that updates the answers to all Items in this
Form PF relating to the hedge funds that you advise.”).
102. See 17 C.F.R. § 279.9 (2014) (establishing filing requirements for Form PF). See
also FORM PF, supra note 14, §§ 1a–b.
103.

See FORM PF, supra note 14, §§ 1b–c.

104. Id. § 1a, Item B.3 (including the following private fund categories: (a) hedge funds,
(b) liquidity funds, (c) private equity funds, (d) real estate funds, (e) securitized asset funds,
(f) venture capital funds, (g) other private funds, (h) funds and accounts other than private
funds).
105. Id. § 1c, Item B.21.
106. Id. § 1c, Items B.22.
107. Id. § 2b, Item D.47.
108. Id. § 2b, Item B.36.
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market factors and their effect on the long and short components of the
portfolio as a percentage of NAV.109
To enable the SEC to understand the exposure of the advisers’ reporting funds and their assets, Form PF requires disclosure pertaining to the
value of turnover by asset class in the respective reporting month110 and
the exposure of long and short positions.111 Similarly, to help the SEC
understand the liquidity of the reporting fund’s portfolios, Form PF requires the investment adviser to disclose the reporting fund’s positions and
the time it would take to liquidate them.112 Form PF also requires the
disclosure of information regarding the investment adviser’s use of trading
and clearing mechanisms.113 In addition, investment advisers have to disclose information regarding the value of each of the advised funds’ borrowings and the types of creditors114 and the aggregate value of all
derivative positions for each advised fund.115 Finally, Form PF requires
disclosure of information pertaining to investor liquidity—time period and
percentage of NAV locked116—and the reporting fund’s restrictions of investor withdrawals and redemptions.117
IV. FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL
In an attempt to correct perceived regulatory weaknesses that may
have contributed to the financial crisis of 2008–2009, the Dodd-Frank Act
created FSOC.118 With FSOC, Congress created a common forum that
enabled financial regulators to assess and address systemic risks that may
develop in less-regulated or unregulated non-bank financial institutions.119
FSOC’s mandate and primary purpose includes identifying and remedying insufficient supervision of large non-bank financial institutions promoting market discipline, and responding to emerging threats to the
stability of the U.S. financial system.120 It is also tasked with curtailing the
complexity of financial institutions and improving the coordination among
109. Id. § 2b, Item C.42.
110. Id. § 2a, Item A.27.
111. Id. § 2a, Item A.26; see also id. § 2b, Item B.30 (pertaining to investment advisers
that advise more than one hedge fund).
112. Id. § 2b, Item B.32.
113. Id. § 1c, Item B.24.
114. Id. § 2d, Item D.43.
115. Id. § 2b, Item D.45.
116. Id. § 2b, Item E.50.
117. Id. § 2b, Item E.49.
118. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 111–12, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392 (2010) (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C.
§§ 5321-22).
119. See id. §112, 124 Stat. 1376, 1394.
120. E.g., FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT (2013), supra
note 31; Amanda Risch, The Financial Stability Oversight Council, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN.
L. 521, 522–23 (2012).
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financial regulators121 and its supervisory responsibilities include evaluating and implementing supervisory priorities and principles.122 Its core duties include: regulatory recommendations for financial regulators; the
identification of regulatory shortcomings that could pose systemic risk;
collection of information on financial firms; monitoring the financial system for potential systemic risks; facilitating the sharing of information and
coordination among financial regulators; suggesting regulatory changes to
Congress for the promotion of efficiency, competitiveness, and stability;
and providing a forum for the resolution of jurisdictional disputes among
council members.123
The governance structure of FSOC facilitates its coordination tasks
and enables it to fulfil its mandate of addressing systemic risks. As a collaborative body chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury, FSOC consists of
ten voting members124 and five nonvoting members125 and brings together
the expertise of federal regulators and state regulators.126 For the purpose
of identifying emerging risks to financial stability, FSOC can request data
and analyses from the OFR and provide direction to the OFR.127 FSOC’s
systemic risk committee and two sub-committees provide structure for
121. Bernanke Speech 2011, supra note 19; Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to
Politics in Financial Regulation, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 327, 369–70 (2013); EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43087, WHO REGULATES WHOM AND HOW? AN OVERVIEW
OF U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY POLICY FOR BANKING AND SECURITIES MARKETS 16–17
(2013) [hereinafter MURPHY, WHO REGULATES], available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R43087.pdf.; EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42083, FINANCIAL STABILITY
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL: A FRAMEWORK TO MITIGATE SYSTEMIC RISK 1–2 (2013), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42083.pdf. See generally Gutter, supra note 19.
122.

Id. at 43–44.

123.

See MURPHY & BERNIER, supra note 17, at 2–9.

124. MURPHY, WHO REGULATES, supra note 121, at 28 (“The council is chaired by the
Secretary of the Treasury and the other voting members consist of the heads of the Federal
Reserve, F[ederal] D[eposit] I[nsurance] C[orporation], O[ffice of the] C[omptroller of the]
C[urrency], N[ational] C[redit] U[nion] A[dministration], S[ecurities and] E[xchange]
C[omission], C[ommodity] F[utures] T[rading] C[omission], F[ederal] H[ousing] F[inance]
A[dministration], C[onsumer] F[inancial] P[rotection] B[ureau] and a member with insurance expertise appointed by the President.”).
125. Id. at 28–29 (“[The five] nonvoting members, serving in an advisory capacity, include the director of the Office of Financial Research (created by Title I to support FSOC),
the head of the Federal Insurance Office (created by Title V of Dodd-Frank), a state banking
supervisor, state insurance commissioner, and a state securities commissioner.”).
126. FAQs about FSOC, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Apr. 10, 2013, 12:00 PM),
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/Pages/default.aspx (“The Financial Stability
Oversight Council has a clear statutory mandate that creates for the first time collective accountability for identifying risks and responding to emerging threats to financial stability. It is
a collaborative body chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury that brings together the expertise of the federal financial regulators, an independent insurance expert appointed by the
President, and state regulators.”).
127. Id. (“Additionally, to help with the identification of emerging risks to financial
stability, FSOC can provide direction to, and request data and analyses from, the newly created Office of Financial Research (OFR) housed within Treasury.”).
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analysing potential emerging systemic risks.128 In addition to the systemic
risk committees, FSOC has its own permanent staff at the OFR, tasked
with providing information, technical expertise and collecting required
data on the financial system.129
1. Procedure for Systemic Risk Assessment of Private Funds
FSOC’s powers over nonbank financial institutions are broad and unprecedented in U.S. financial regulation.130 The Dodd-Frank Act gave
FSOC the power to subject a nonbank financial company to extensive supervision by the Federal Reserve.131 While FSOC has to consider several
quantitative metrics in its systemic risk assessment of non-bank financial
institutions,132 the Dodd-Frank Act allowed FSOC to consider any other
risk-related factors it may deem appropriate,133 underscoring its broad
powers. Moreover, the Dodd-Frank Act specifically prohibits “antieva128. Continuing Oversight of the Implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Focusing on Provisions Related to Monitoring Systemic Risk and Promoting Financial Stability: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affairs, 112th Cong. 65 (2011) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2011/
ts051211mls.htm (“FSOC has established a Systemic Risk Committee that seeks to identify,
highlight and review possible risks that could develop across the financial system.”); FAQs
about FSOC, supra note 126 (“The structure is intended to balance the need for an interdisciplinary and cross-cutting approach with the need to leverage existing expertise and experience . . . . This committee includes senior staff and reports to the Deputies Committee.”); Id.
(“This committee is the locus of accountability for risk monitoring and plays a role in prioritizing the review of sources of risk and guiding the work of staff and the systemic risk
subcommittees.”).
129. MURPHY & BERNIER, supra note 17, at 1.
130. See generally D. Jean Veta & Michael Nonaka, The Dodd-Frank Act and the Financial Crisis: A Retrospective Assessment of the Act’s Systemic Risk Regulation Provisions,
in 6 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW: RESTORING FINANCIAL
STABILITY, THE LEGAL RESPONSE 71 (International Monetary Fund ed., 2012).
131. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 111–13, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
5321-23) (outlining the purpose of FSOC, which is to determine the material financial distress of nonbank financial companies and to bring such entities under the prudential supervision of the Federal Reserve); id. at §§ 113–15 (authorizing FSOC to designate a nonbank
financial institution for enhanced prudential standards and consolidated supervision by the
Fed); id. at § 165 (instructing the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve to develop
special prudential standards that are to be applied to any bank holding company holding
assets of more than $50 billion, as well as to any firms designated by FSOC). See MURPHY &
BERNIER, supra note 17, at 1–2; see also Designations - Nonbank Financial Company Designations, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (DEC. 17, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/
designations/Pages/default.aspx.
132. Dodd-Frank Act § 113(a)(2).
133. Id. at § 113(a)(2)(K). See also Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of
Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A(III)(a) (2014)(noting that
FSOC “has authority to assess nonbank financial companies, and their relationships with
other nonbank financial companies and market participants, in a manner that addresses the
statutory considerations and such other factors the Council deems appropriate”).
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sion” by nonbank financial institutions,134 further extending FSOC’s powers. On its own initiative, FSOC may determine with a two-thirds vote if a
nonbank financial institution is systemically important.135 While DoddFrank prescribes several considerations that the Council must take into
account in its determination of what entities qualify as Systemically Important Financial Institution (SIFI), the quantitative systemic risk assessment
measures are not specifically codified and FSOC can change thresholds
and analysis via the rule making process.136
FSOC applies two broad standards to the designation of the non-bank
financial institution as a SIFI. First, FSOC assesses whether the “material
financial distress” at a nonbank financial institution could pose a threat to
the stability of the financial system.137 Secondly, FSOC takes into account
in its assessment the nature, size, scope, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the nonbank financial institution as
possible threats to the financial system.138 Commonly managed investment funds that manage $50 billion or more in the aggregate of total consolidated assets could be designated a SIFI, particularly if such funds all
follow a similar investment strategy.139
134.

Dodd-Frank Act § 113(c).

135.

Id. § 113(a)(1).

136.

Id. § 113(a)(1), (a)(2)(K); 12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A (2014).

137. 12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A(II) (“[A] ‘threat to the financial stability of the United
States’ . . . exist[s] if there would be an impairment of financial intermediation or of financial
market functioning that would be sufficiently severe to inflict significant damage on the
broader economy. . . . An impairment of financial intermediation and financial market functioning can be occur through several channels [including] . . . exposure, . . . asset liquidation,
. . . [or] critical function or service”); see generally Adrian et al., supra note 30; Dodd-Frank
§165(i)(2) (Whether a nonbank financial institution is in “material financial distress” will be
assessed by FSOC as if the financial industry as a whole were in a period of overall stress and
in a weak market environment, similar to bank stress tests conducted by the Fed under Section 165(i)(2) of Dodd-Frank Act).
138. 12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A(II)(c) (explaining that This standard will be met if the
“nature of a nonbank financial company’s business practices, conduct, or operations could
pose a threat to U.S. financial stability, regardless of whether the nonbank financial company
is experiencing financial distress,” and because large nonbank financial companies that experience financial distress often impact the broader financial industry there will be significant
overlap between the two FSOC determination standards for SIFI status of nonbank financial
institutions). Dodd-Frank Act § 113(a)(2) (listing 10 considerations that FSOC must take
into account in making a SIFI determination).
139. 12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A(III)(a) (“A nonbank financial company will be evaluated
further in Stage 2 if it meets both the total consolidated assets threshold and any one of the
other thresholds. The thresholds are: Total Consolidated Assets. The Council intends to apply a size threshold of $50 billion in total consolidated assets. . . . Credit Default Swaps
Outstanding. The Council intends to apply a threshold of $30 billion in gross notional credit
default swaps (“CDS”) outstanding for which a nonbank financial company is the reference
entity. . . . Derivative Liabilities. The Council intends to apply a threshold of $3.5 billion of
derivative liabilities. . . . Total Debt Outstanding. The Council intends to apply a threshold of
$20 billion in total debt outstanding. . . . Leverage Ratio. The Council intends to apply a
threshold leverage ratio of total consolidated assets (excluding separate accounts) to total
equity of 15 to 1 . . . . Short-Term Debt Ratio. The Council intends to apply a threshold ratio
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The Dodd-Frank Act requires certain statutory considerations to determine whether or not a nonbank financial institution meets either of the
two standards.140 FSOC organized these statutory considerations into a
six-category framework, each category reflecting a different dimension of
the nonbank financial institution’s potential threat to financial stability:
leverage, liquidity risk and maturity mismatch, size, interconnectedness,
substitutability, and existing regulatory scrutiny.141
Based on its six-category analytical framework, FSOC employs a threestage process of increasing in-depth evaluation and analysis to determine
whether a nonbank financial institution creates a threat to the financial
stability of the United States.142 In stage one, applying six quantitative
thresholds, FSOC uses a mechanical screening process to eliminate those
nonbank financial institutions from review that are unlikely to pose significant systemic risk and may not merit SIFI designation.143 Only those nonbank financial institutions that raised systemic concerns in stage one will
of total debt outstanding (as defined above) with a maturity of less than 12 months to total
consolidated assets (excluding separate accounts) of 10 percent. . . .”); see also Joseph P.
Vitale & Marc E. Elovitz, FSOC Issues Final Rule on Designating Nonbanks as “Systemically
Important”—What Private Fund Managers Need to Know, SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL (Apr.
12, 2012), http://www.srz.com/FSOC_Issues_Final_Rule_on_Designating_Nonbanks_as_Sys
temically_Important.
140. Dodd-Frank Act §113(a)(2) at 1399 (“(2) CONSIDERATIONS.—In making a determination under paragraph (1), the Council shall consider—
(A) the extent of the leverage of the company;
(B) the extent and nature of the off-balance-sheet exposures of the company;
(C) the extent and nature of the transactions and relationships of the company with other
significant nonbank financial companies and significant bank holding companies;
(D) the importance of the company as a source of credit for households, businesses, and
State and local governments and as a source of liquidity for the United States financial
system;
(E) the importance of the company as a source of credit for low-income, minority, or
underserved communities, and the impact that the failure of such company would have on
the availability of credit in such communities;
(F) the extent to which assets are managed rather than owned by the company, and the
extent to which ownership of assets under management is diffuse;
(G) the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, and mix of the activities of the company;
(H) the degree to which the company is already regulated by 1 or more primary financial
regulatory agencies;
(I) the amount and nature of the financial assets of the company;
(J) the amount and types of the liabilities of the company, including the degree of reliance
on short-term funding; and
(K) any other risk-related factors that the Council deems appropriate.”); see also 12
C.F.R. § 1310 app. A(II)(c).
141. 12 C.F.R. 1310 app. A(III)(c).
142. Id. See generally Gregory S. Rowland, Designation of Asset Managers and Funds as
Systemically Important Non-Bank Financial Institutions: Process and Industry Implications,
20 INVESTMENT L. 1, 1–2 (2013), available at http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/
files/Publication/496c5f23-8c9a-48ae-bd95-078e31e4b632/Preview/PublicationAttachment/55
85c767-083c-48ed-b549-0d07d4cc1515/IL_April_2013_Rowland_article.pdf.
143. 12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A(III)(a); see generally Vitale & Elovitz, supra note 139.
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be subject to more institution-specific and qualitative evaluation in stage
two and thereafter possibly stage three.144 In stage two FSOC prioritizes
those nonbank financial institutions identified in stage one based on quantitative and qualitative public and regulatory sources of information and
initiates the consultation process with the primary financial regulatory
agencies.145 In stage three, FSOC contacts each identified nonbank financial institution to collect additional information that was not available in
stages one and two.146 The combined information from all three stages is
then evaluated.147 Should FSOC conclude at the conclusion of stage three
that the nonbank financial company creates a threat to the stability of the
U.S. financial system, FSOC will request a hearing in accordance with section 113(e) of the Dodd-Frank Act.148
Designation as a SIFI would change the nature of the regulation for
the respective nonbank financial institution and subject such entity to substantial additional regulations,149 requiring the respective entity to change
the way it does business. This change in the way a nonbank does business
could impact its growth as such entity may be required to bolster its balance sheet and curtail risk.150

144. See generally Press Release, Financial Stability Oversight Council, Financial Stability Oversight Council Makes First Nonbank Financial Company Designations to Address
Potential Threats to Financial Stability (Jul. 9, 2013) [hereinafter FSOC Company Designations], available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2004.aspx.
145.

12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A(III)(b).

146.

Id. § 1310 app. A(III)(c).

147. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT (2013), supra note
31; FSOC Company Designations, supra note 144 (“Each nonbank financial company that is
reviewed in Stage 3 is notified that it is under consideration and is provided an opportunity to
submit written materials related to the Council’s consideration of the company for a proposed designation.”).
148.

12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A(III).

149. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank
Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 115(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1392 (2010) (codified as amended in 12
U.S.C. 5321–23) (once designated as a SIFI, the respective entity will be subject to extensive
regulation and supervision by the Federal Reserve Board under Title I of the Dodd-Frank
Act); MURPHY & BERNIER, supra note 17, at 24; Dodd-Frank Act at § 115(a) (noting that the
regulatory standards for non-bank financial firms under Fed supervision are more stringent
than the standard for non-bank financial firms outside of Fed supervision); id at § 115(b)(1)
(noting that the Fed has the authority to require such non-bank financial institutions to comply with the following prudential standards: leverage limits, liquidity requirements, enhanced
public disclosures, concentration limits, risk-based capital requirements, resolution plan and
credit exposure report requirements, a contingent capital requirement, short-term debt limits, and overall risk management requirements).
150. Douglas J. Elliot, Regulating Systemically Important Financial Institutions That Are
Not Banks, INITIATIVE ON BUS. AND PUB. POL’Y AT BROOKINGS, 1 (May 9, 2013)
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/05/09%20regulating%20finan
cial%20institutions%20elliott/09%20regulating%20financial%20institutions%20elliott.pdf.
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2. Data Analysis
The design of Form PF is intended to provide FSOC with the required
empirical data to determine the extent to which the activities of private
funds and/or their advisers pose a systemic risk.151 Of particular interest
for FSOC’s systemic risk analysis via Form PF data is the concentration of
fund investments by geography and industry, the systemic exposure to specific financial institutions and credit counterparties, and the concentration
of the respective private funds’ investor base.152
FSOC’s three-stage review process for SIFI designation depends heavily on the information provided by private fund investment advisers in
Form PF.153 A large proportion of the information provided in Form PF
also relates directly to the six-category framework FSOC uses throughout
its SIFI designation process. The six-category framework is organized in
accordance with the statutory considerations set out by the Dodd-Frank
Act and is designed to determine whether or not a nonbank financial institution merits a SIFI designation.154 Each category reflects a different dimension of the nonbank financial institution’s potential threat to financial
stability: leverage, liquidity risk and maturity mismatch, size, interconnectedness, substitutability, and existing regulatory scrutiny.155
The information in Form PF either directly or indirectly addresses
most of FSOC’s stage one thresholds.156 More specifically, the following
Form PF Questions provide specific information for FSOC’s stage one
threshold assessment: Form PF Question 8 (gross asset value of reporting
fund) is directly relevant for FSOC’s stage one threshold for $50 billion in
total consolidated assets; Form PF Questions 13, 44 (value of derivative
positions) help assess the threshold of $3.5 billion in derivative liabilities;
Form PF Questions 46 (financing liquidity) and 58 (financing information)
inform the $20 billion threshold in stage one for total debt outstanding;
and Form PF Questions 8 (gross assets value of reporting fund) and 9 (net
asset value of reporting fund) help determine the 15 to 1 leverage ratio in
FSOC’s stage one assessment.157
151. Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool
Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, 76 Fed. Reg. 71,128, 71,129 (Nov.
16, 2011) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 & 279).
152.

See FORM PF, supra note 14, at §2a.

153.

See supra notes 137–140 and accompanying text; 12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A(III).

154. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, §113(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1398 (2010); 12 C.F.R. § 1310 App. A(II)(d)(2).
155.

12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A(II)(d)(2) (2014).

156. Rowland, supra note 142, at 2 (excluding the Stage 1 threshold relating to the
credit default swaps written on the nonbank financial company); id at 3 (“During this stage,
the Council will analyze public or regulatory information about the relevant NBFC, including
industry- and company-specific metrics beyond those analyzed in Stage 1.”).
157. Compare 12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A(III)(a) (FSOC’s Stage 1 thresholds) with FORM
PF, supra note 14, at § 2a (information filed by private fund investment advisers in Form PF).
See also Rowland, supra note 142, at 5–7.
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Form PF data is also used in FSOC’s stage two SIFI designation analysis. Several Form PF Questions provide directly relevant information for
the six criteria considered by FSOC in its stage two analysis and beyond:
Form PF Questions 22, 23, 36 and 37 (five counterparties to which the
reporting fund has the greatest mark-to-market net counterparty credit exposure) provides highly relevant information to determine the interconnectedness of private funds; Form PF Question 8 (gross assets value of
reporting fund) helps FSOC assess the size of private funds/advisers; Form
PF Questions 30 (reporting fund exposure) and 56 (product exposures)
help FSOC in assessing the fund substitutability; Form PF Questions 32
(liquidity of reporting funds’ portfolio) and 55 (reporting fund assets) can
help FSOC compare the liquidity of a funds’ assets with the liquidity of
investors in Questions 50 (investor liquidity) and 64 (investor liquidity in
percent) to analyse funds’ liquidity and maturity mismatch risk; Form PF
Questions 8, 9, 43, 44, 46, 58, and 66 can help FSOC assess the reporting
fund’s leverage; finally Form PF Questions 40 (reporting fund’s VaR) and
42 (effect of market factors on portfolio) can help FSOC assess the overall
riskiness of private funds advisers’ investments.158
V. PRIVATE FUND DATA

AND

SYSTEMIC RISK ASSESSMENT

The analysis in this Article suggests that the evidence provided by the
SEC159 and FSOC,160 in combination with the data provided by the author in a prior study,161 confirms concerns over Form PF data insufficiency
and possible inaccuracies. These challenges for Form PF data could have
an effect on FSOC’s systemic risk assessment of private fund advisers.
1. Sub-optimality of Systemic Risk Data
The analysis of the data collected in Form PF presents several key challenges. The SEC suggests that the consistency of investment adviser’s responses on Form PF is not ensured and could be questionable.162 Other
challenges with Form PF identified by the SEC include the differences in
approaches taken by investment advisers in completing Form PF and differences in assumptions made by investment advisers in completing Form
PF.163 Upon initial analysis of Form PF data, the SEC identified data
anomalies deemed to be attributable to filer error,164 which precipitated
158. FORM PF, supra note 14, at §2a; Compare FSOC’s Stage 1 thresholds in 12 C.F.R.
§ 1310 app. A(III)(a) (2014) with the information filed by private fund investment advisers in
Form PF; see also Rowland, supra note 141, at 5–7.
159. See infra notes 163–67.
160. See infra notes 171–72.
161. See Kaal, Registration, supra note 2222, at 316–17.
162. See SEC 2013, supra note 92, at 1.
163. See Id.
164. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 207, 18 U.S.C. § 80b (2014) (making any
willful misstatements or omission of a material fact in any report filed with the SEC pursuant
to the Investment Advisers Act unlawful).
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SEC concerns about the quality of the information provided by private
fund advisers.165 While the SEC is making a concerted effort to improve
Form PF data quality by issuing FAQs on interpretive issues and requesting curative amendments of Form PF filings from filers,166 expanding the
utility of Form PF data without sufficient confidence in the accuracy of the
information provided by investment advisers on Form PF remains difficult.
On the upside, the SEC’s experience with Form PF data is in its early
stages and the data quality and utility is likely to evolve over time as filers
become more familiar with the requirements of Form PF and the methods
of calculation.167
The SEC also appears to be aware of possible data quality shortcomings168 because it continues to assess Form PF data quality.169 Similarly,
in its attempt to identify activities of twenty of the largest U.S. fund managers as possible sources of systemic risk,170 FSOC acknowledged that the
available data was insufficient—at least in the context of counterparty
risks and leverage, including the repo market and securities lending and in
the context of separate fund accounts.171
A prior study conducted by the author also identified several shortcomings of the data collected via Form PF.172 The author identified as
core substantive issues with Form PF: the ambiguity of several key questions on Form PF, the inaccuracy of Form PF definitions and corresponding insufficiency of SEC guidance for Form PF, and difficulties in
aggregating the required Form PF information.173
The author’s prior study suggests that the definition of RAUM required a level of interpretation by filers.174 The level of interpretation
165. Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool
Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, 76 Fed. Reg. 71,128, 71,129 (Nov.
16, 2011) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 & 279).
166. See Form PF Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://
www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/pfrd/pfrdfaq.shtml (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
167.

Cf. Kaal, Disclosure, supra note 22, at 39–40.

168. OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, ASSET MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 2
(2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/ofr/research/Documents/OFR_AMFS_
FINAL.pdf (“Unfortunately, there are limitations to the data currently available to measure,
analyze, and monitor asset management firms and their diverse activities, and to evaluate
their implications for financial stability. These data gaps are not broadly recognized.”); Yin
Wilczek, ‘Data Gaps’ About Asset Managers Stymies Analysis of Risks Posed by Industry,
BLOOMBERG BNA 1 (Sept. 30, 2013) (“There are ‘significant data gaps’ regarding the activities of asset managers that make it difficult to fully analyze or measure the threat posed by
the industry to financial stability, the Office of Financial Research said Sept. 30.”).
169.

See SEC 2013, supra note 92, at 1.

170. See generally FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT (2013),
supra note 31.
171.

Id. at 12–13.

172.

See generally id.; Kaal, Disclosure, supra note 22, at 39–40.

173.

Id. at 40.

174.

Id. at 26.
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required to answer Form PF precipitated particular concerns pertaining to
the definition of counterparties and performance measures for counterparties in Form PF. Many respondents in the author’s prior study indicated
that several Form PF questions and definitions had to be optimized, including performance information required by Form PF.175 Respondents
informed the author that Form PF instructions generally needed clarification, the definitions for RAUM/AUM in Form PF had to be improved and
respondents generally disagreed with the definition of funds in Form
PF.176 Over forty percent of fifty two respondents in the prior study suggested that they disagreed with definitions or instructions in Form PF.177
2. Impact on Systemic Risk Assessment
Given the identified shortcomings of Form PF data, the systemic risk
assessment process employed by FSOC could be compromised. The author’s prior study identified problems with several core Form PF questions
that provide specific information for FSOC’s stage one threshold assessment. More specifically, the author’s prior work suggests that the definition of RAUM required a level of interpretation by filers.178 FSOC is
using asset valuations in Form PF that are associated with RAUM, such as
gross asset value of reporting fund (Form PF Question 8), the value of
derivative positions (Form PF Questions 13, 44), financing information
and financing liquidity (Form PF Questions 46 and 58), as well as gross
and net assets value of reporting fund (Form PF Questions 8 and 9) to
determine various stage one thresholds.179 Given FSOC’s direct or indirect use of RAUM related data (and FSOC’s emphasis on such data), in
combination with the author’s prior study suggesting that RAUM requires
substantial interpretation,180 it seems at least questionable if FSOC will be
able to use the related Form PF data effectively and sustainably for its
systemic risk evaluations and the designation of non-bank financial companies as systemically risky.
FSOC’s stage two assessment process could be equally affected. The
author’s prior study identified problems with several Form PF Questions
that provide specific information for FSOC’s stage two threshold assessment. The determination of a private fund’s size and leverage in FSOC’s
stage two also relies on Form PF RAUM data and could be subject to
inaccuracies because the RAUM measures reported by private funds can
required a level of interpretation by the filers, as identified in the author’s
prior study.181 The author’s prior study also suggests that the level of in175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 38.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Vitale & Elovitz, supra note 139; see generally FORM PF, supra note 14.
Kaal, Disclosure, supra note 22, at 26.
Id.
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terpretation required to answer Form PF affects performance measures in
Form PF Question 17, counterparties and definitions of counterparties in
Form PF Questions 22 and 23.182 Form PF questions 22 and 23 are directly used in FSOC’s stage two analysis to determine the interconnectedness of private funds.
In addition to the specific matching of Form PF data issues with
FSOC’s uses of Form PF data, Form PF data may also present several
more generic areas of concern for FSOC’s systemic risk evaluation. Over
forty percent of fifty-two respondents in the author’s prior study suggested
that they disagreed with definitions or instructions in Form PF.183 This
suggests that a large proportion of filers are uncertain as to how Form PF
questions are to be answered. This uncertainty raises the possibility that
the filers are using estimates and a variety of assumptions to complete
Form PF. If FSOC relies on Form PF data in its systemic risk assessment
that is subject to inaccuracies, it appears possible that FSOC’s work pertaining to private funds could in turn be subject to errors.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Article suggests that Form PF data reporting encountered issues
that could affect FSOC’s systemic risk assessment of private funds. The
author does not suggest that FSOC is unable to fulfill Congress’s mandate.
The observations in this article pertaining to the sub-optimality of Form
PF data are primarily based on the quantification of survey respondents’
opinions in the author’s prior study. The author identified and matched
the relevance of purported Form PF data issues with the respective use
and emphasis of Form PF data in FSOC’s systemic risk assessment. The
matching of identified Form PF issues with FSOC’s respective use of such
sub-optimal Form PF data suggests that possible inaccuracies may exist in
FSOC’s systemic risk assessment process. The author does not claim scientific and empirical precision in the analysis. Addressing the identified
problems with Form PF data could help optimize FSOC’s systemic risk
assessment of private funds.

182.
183.

Id. at 38.
Id.
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